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Abstract This study investigated how female directors of corporate boards of directors (BoD) experience boardroom 
dynamics. The study represents an initial research trend that moves from a unilateral focus on financial outcomes of 
female representation in BoDs toward stronger attention on the social dynamics in the boardroom. Drawing on social 
identity theory, the study proposed that female directors often constitute an out-group within the BoD, preventing them 
from experiencing positive board dynamics. More specifically, the study explored the extent to which female directors 
do experience less justice, lower cohesion, and higher levels of conflicts within the BoD than their male counterparts 
do. Moreover, we assumed that female directors with nontraditional educational backgrounds would be particularly 
likely to experience negative boardroom dynamics whereas female chairpersons of BoDs would perceive boardroom 
dynamics more positively than other female directors. The sample consisted of 491 directors from 149 BoDs. Our 
findings revealed that there were generally few differences in the way female and male directors experienced boardroom 
dynamics and female chairpersons of BoDs did not perceive the dynamics differently than other female directors. 
Female directors with nontraditional educational backgrounds perceived the boardroom dynamics somewhat more 
negatively than other female directors, but the differences were not statistically significant. The conclusions from this 
study are that there are reasons to believe that female directors are welcomed into boardrooms, not perceived as out-
groups, and BoDs are able to benefit from the female directors’ experience and skills. 
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Introduction 
 
Diversity in the boardroom is an issue receiving increased attention both in academia and in the popular press (see 
Daily and Dalton 2003a). In order to increase gender diversity, several countries are in the process of legislating 
mandatory female representation on corporate boards of directors (BoDs) (see Adams and Flynn 2005). In recent 
years, there has been increased representation by women on BoDs although men are still in the majority (see Terjesen 
et al. 2009 for a review). In Europe, the proportion of women on BoDs has increased from 5 % in 2001 to 8.4 % in 2007 
(Heidrick and Struggles 2007). 
Gender-diverse BoD composition may be valuable for several reasons (see Bilimoria 2000; Daily and Dalton 2003b). 
First, there is a major issue concerning morality and justice, with the basic view that each individual’s interest is  
equally important.  Eyring and Stead  (1998, p. 245) exemplified this view, stating that ‘‘when women and minorities 
follow the same  paths  of  education  and work experience to prepare themselves as qualified candidates for upward 
 
  
career mobility, it is simply unjust to stand in their way.’’ Second, female board directors may positively influence 
value creation in the organization; females may bring a ‘‘broader, fresher, and different voice to the table’’ (Fondas and 
Sassalos 2000, p. 20). Seen from a resource-dependence perspective, a variety of board directors widens the expertise 
present and expands the network of individuals to which the BoD has access (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Thus, 
organizations may increase their survival odds and resource acquisition by increasing their network to other 
organizations and other important stakeholders. Third, gender diversity may increase innovative behavior in boardrooms 
because a variety of perspectives may emerge when board directors differ (see Campbell and Minguez-Vera 2008). 
Nevertheless, studies on the effects of female representation on boards are inconclusive regarding corporate 
performance. While some studies indicate that inclusion of women on the BoD has no effect on value creation (Farrell and 
Hersch 2005; Rose 2007; Shrader et al. 1997), others report positive effects (Carter et al. 2003; Erhardt et al. 2003). 
Whereas this prior research substantiates the extent to which female presence in the boardroom affects value creation, 
researchers have not yet sufficiently investigated the mechanisms that may underlie these differing results. Specifically, 
what boardroom dynamics and interactions unfold that may influence value creation (see Bilimoria 2000)? The aim of 
the present study is therefore to explore what happens when women enter the boardroom: how do female directors 
perceive the boardroom dynamics and interactions, and to what extent do these perceptions differ from their male 
counterparts? Drawing on social identity theory (Turner and Haslam 2001), this study addresses the question whether 
female directors perceive themselves to be integrated members of the board or like outsiders not fully accepted as part 
of the BoD. Because there are, in general, few female directors, they may often be considered as out-groups in BoDs 
whereas the male directors constitute the in-groups. According to social identity theory, people will exhibit a favorable 
bias toward others who they perceive as members of their in-group, while they will view themselves as being in 
disagreement with out-group members (Turner and Haslam 2001). Out-groups may easily be marginalized within the 
group and the majority may have the stronger influence by virtue of their greater number (Asch 1955). In a BoD, a 
categorization of directors into those belonging to an in-group and out-group may create a barrier to cooperative behavior 
and may even stimulate competitive behavior among the directors (Brewer 1995; Sanchez-Mazas et al. 1994). In a study 
that addressed the influence of female directors on firm innovation, Torchia et al.  (2011)  found that increasing the 
number of female directors from one or two to at least three enhanced the level of firm innovation. Thus, being a small 
minority may reduce the possibility of female directors having a positive influence in the BoD, and the extent to 
which minorities can contribute effectively may depend on whether they are accepted as full group members (‘‘ingroup’’) 
as opposed to being an ‘‘outgroup’’ of the BoD (Westphal and Milton 2000). 
The aim of this study is to explore female directors’ perceptions of BoD processes based on social identity theory 
and the extent to which they experience the board-room social setting as constructive as compared to their male 
counterparts. With this aim in mind, we consider the established concepts ‘‘perceived justice’’ (Greenberg 1990), 
‘‘cohesion’’ (Summers et al. 1988), and ‘‘conflict’’ (Jehn 1995) as particularly relevant. These concepts con- stitute 
central dynamic group processes that could have a significant impact on the success of the BoD. These group dynamics 
are likely to be experienced differently by the directors depending on how strong identification they have with the other 
directors. A minority or outsider of a board (i.e., female directors) may feel unfairly treated by the other directors since 
the other directors’ loyalty probably points toward other male directors with whom they identify more strongly. For the 
same reason, female directors may experience lower cohesion within the BoD than male directors do. It is also likely  
that female directors will experience higher levels of conflict since the male members who are in the in-group 
possibly protect each other against marginalized groups. In the following section, we will provide a more detailed 
description of these assumptions. 
 
 
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
 
As described above, one of the main arguments for including women on BoDs is to promote a broader diversity of 
perspectives, experiences and viewpoints. Increasing BoD diversity is expected to have positive effects on the quality of 
decision making when it gives rise to disagreement and debate. In particular, when a minority on a BoD is able to 
question the attitudes, beliefs, policies, and procedures that are assumed by the majority, new perspectives can be 
developed (the so-called minority dissent; De Dreu and De Vries 1997). However, according to social identity theory, 
there will typically be a tendency to listen more to the majority (in-group) members’ views and reject the ideas that 
come from minority representatives (out-group). Social identity theory (Turner 1982) suggests that individuals possess a 
social identity based on their membership in distinct groups or categories (e.g., gender). Individuals use observable and 
salient features (e.g., gender-based characteristics) 
 
 
 
associated with different groups to categorize one another (Rothbart and John 1985). Since gender is associated with very 
salient features, social categorization on the basis of this feature is virtually automatic (Fiske and Neuberg 1990). The 
categorization of someone as a member of one’s group (in-group) or not (out-group) will determine subsequent inter- 
action with that person. People will tend to exhibit a favorable bias toward others who they categorize as the in-group while 
they will distance themselves from people who do not have the same characteristics as themselves (Turner and Haslam 
2001). In-group members are expected to have shared interests and objectives, and cooperative behavior follows since 
it is consistent with one’s self interest (Joshi and Jackson 2003). In a BoD, the categorization of directors into those 
belonging to an in-group and out-group may create a barrier to cooperative behavior among directors and may stimulate a 
competitive behavior and even conflicts (see Joshi and Jackson 2003). Owing to their under-representation in the BoD, 
some researchers have even viewed female directors as ‘‘tokens’’ or ‘‘symbols’’ who are highly visible and at the same time 
stand quiet alone as a minority within the BoD. As tokens, they may be perceived negatively, will be doubted, or not 
trusted (see Torchia et al. 2011). As a result, of such labeling, female directors may feel uncomfortable, isolated, and 
having self-doubt. In support of this perspective, studies on social networks suggest that employees tend to form 
relationships with each other based on their gender (Ibarra 1992), indicating that female directors may stay relatively 
isolated among the male directors. Female directors may not be heard or taken seriously, and they may therefore feel lack 
of cohesion or even unfairly treated. Below, we will present these issues more in detail. 
 
Perceived Justice 
 
Organizational justice theory refers to perceptions of fairness in the workplace (Greenberg 1990) and researchers have 
categorized at least four different forms of justice: procedural (Leventhal 1980), distributive (Adams 1965), 
interpersonal (Bies and Moag 1986; Moorman 1991) and informational (Greenberg 1993). In accordance with social 
identity theory, female directors will typically be perceived as an out-group within a BoD and may find it more difficult to 
establish beneficial social relationships with other directors. Directors may have a tendency to give priority to those who 
belong to the in-group so that the out-group members will experience unfair treatment. Because males more often 
comprise the in-group, they will have the majority of votes and may feel they have stronger support for their arguments 
among the other board directors who themselves are males. Therefore, female directors may more often experience 
injustice than their male counterparts do. The procedural component of justice refers to the perceived quality of 
decision-making procedures, indicating, for instance, whether procedures include input and influence from all board 
directors. In order to profit from the possibly diverse knowledge and experience that female directors represent, these 
women need to perceive that they are able to voice their views and arguments, and that they can influence decisions made 
in the BoD. However, decisions often seem to be influenced through the building of alliances, which can also be the 
case with BoDs. In a qualitative study, Huse and Solberg (2006) found that creating alliances was the topic that female 
directors referred to most frequently when they were asked about power and processes. The women concluded that to 
influence decisions in the boardroom, one would need to build alliances with other directors. Konrad et al. (2008) 
interviewed female directors and one of them stated that she felt ‘‘that some things are discussed outside of meetings. We 
are not quite part of the inner circle’’ (p. 154). If, in reality, decisions are made before meetings, for instance on the golf 
course or at a dinner party with the ‘‘boys,’’ it may be hard for directors (i.e., females) who do not attend these functions 
to influence the decisions. Thus, male and female directors may have unequal admission to decision-making arenas. 
 
Hypothesis 1a Female directors perceive lower levels of procedural justice in the boardroom than male directors do. 
 
Distributive justice relates to the fairness of reward or outcome distributions, which are often based on an equity 
principle whereby rewards should be proportional to directors’ inputs (Adams 1965). Consistent with social identity 
theory, people will exhibit a favorable bias toward other members of the in-group, and we would expect that the head of 
BoDs give priority to board members who are most similar to themselves. Thus, it is reasonable to think that female 
directors will find that the distribution of benefits is not fair to them. They possibly find that they provide a relatively 
large contribution to the BoD compared to what they get back. 
 
Hypothesis 1b Female directors perceive lower levels of distributional justice in the boardroom than male directors do. 
 
The interpersonal component of the justice concept refers to the perceived quality of treatment by other directors. It 
indicates whether employees and directors are treated in a polite manner and with dignity and respect (Bies and Moag 
1986). According to social identity theory, the categorization of directors in those belonging to in-groups or out-
groups will build obstacles to cooperative behavior among the directors (Brewer 1995). Because female directors are  
 
 
often an out-group on a BoD, they will possibly be vulnerable to the exposure of disrespectful and negative behavior from 
other directors. In support of this suggestion, studies of the more extreme type of negative behavior, namely 
harassment, have demonstrated a relationship between being a minority and being harassed. Leyman (1993) found that 
minority male kindergarten teachers were more often victimized by harassment than their female counterparts. 
Furthermore, in a study among assistant nurses, males, who constituted only 3 % of this work group, had a 
significantly higher risk of being harassed than did females (Eriksen and Einarsen 2004). 
 
Hypothesis 1c Female directors perceive lower levels of interpersonal justice in the boardroom than male directors. 
 
Informational justice refers to whether one perceives information as open, reasonable, fair, and timely (Shapiro et al. 
1994). If members of a BoD (e.g., females) get a label as the out-group not respected or accepted as a full BoD member, 
other directors may not consider these persons as a relevant receiver and discussion partner of information. A possible 
consequence may be that the information given to these directors is reduced or distorted or may come too late to be useful in 
decision-making. 
 
Hypothesis 1d Female directors perceive lower levels of informational justice in the boardroom than male directors do. 
 
Cohesion 
 
Cohesion refers to the degree to which directors are attracted to each other and are motivated to continue as members of the BoD 
(Summers et al. 1988; see also Forbes and Milliken 1999). Directors of highly cohesive BoDs will be keen to attend 
meetings, tend to be satisfied with the BoD, use ‘‘we’’ rather than ‘‘I’’ in boardroom discussions, and are friendly toward each 
other. On the contrary, a BoD with low cohesion will be characterized by absenteeism, lack of attainment, or the development 
of cliques and factions (see Summers et al. 1988). According to social identity theory, social categorization enables persons 
to identify with others like them-selves, nourishing a need for affiliation and to maintain and improve a positive social 
identity (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Thus, we would expect that a stronger sense of cohesion develop among individuals 
that categorize themselves as similar to each other. Differences between members of a group may create barriers to a 
shared group identity so that cohesion is not established. In particular, when BoDs are composed of an out-group and an 
in-group, there may be an increased chance that the out-group perceives lower cohesion with the total group. Consequently, 
as the out-group in most boardrooms, female directors may perceive the BoD to be less cohesive than the ingroup consisting 
of men. In general, members of minority groups often find it hard to develop positive social relationships within their 
work groups simply because of the absence of others who are similar to them (see Joshi and Jackson 2003). In support of 
this view, Tsui et al. (1992) found that being different from the group in terms of gender resulted in feelings of lower 
social integration. Feelings of isolation may be a natural result for the female directors on BoDs with male dominance. 
 
Hypothesis 2 Female directors perceive lower levels of boardroom cohesion than male directors. 
 
Conflicts 
 
Conflicts can be defined as ‘‘perceptions by the parties involved that they hold discrepant views or have interper- 
sonal incompatibilities’’ (Jehn 1995, p. 257). Researchers have made a distinction between relationship (or emotional) 
conflicts and task conflicts. Jehn (1995) defines relationship conflicts as ‘‘interpersonal incompatibilities among group 
members, which typically includes tension, animosity, and annoyance among members within a group’’ (p. 258) and 
task conflict as ‘‘disagreement among group members about the content of the task being performed, including 
differences in viewpoints, ideas and opinions’’ (p. 258). From a social identity theoretical perspective, we would think 
that directors will tend to turn toward the ones they perceive as similar and draw away from those perceived as 
different. Because female directors may form an out-group (or be labeled as tokens), which is confronted with the 
established norms and habits of the BoD as a group, they will possibly perceive more conflict than males who may 
argue on the safe ground of traditions. Thus, female directors, who may often be perceived as those disturbing the 
‘‘peaceful homogeneity’’ in the boardroom, will then become the topic of discussions. We assume that female directors 
will experience higher levels of both task-and relationship conflicts. Social identity theory predicts that homogenous 
parts of a group (e.g., men) are most likely to form impermeable boundaries that bind these members together, while 
rejecting other and different members of the group (e.g., females). While female directors may bring a ‘‘broader, 
fresher, and different voice to the table’’ (Fondas and Sassalos  2000,  p. 20), these different perspectives are likely to 
face disagreement, being challenged or even rejected. Representing an out-group in the BoD, we assume that the females 
will experience such task conflicts more often than male directors do. Moreover, being an out-group that experiences 
rejections, skepticism, and other types of negative practices, we assume that female directors also perceive the relationship 
 
 
conflict level to be higher than their male counterparts do. 
 
Hypothesis 3a Female directors perceive higher levels of task conflicts in the boardroom than male directors do. 
 
Hypothesis 3b Female directors perceive higher levels of relationship conflicts in the boardroom than male directors do. 
 
The level of conflict perceived by female directors will probably be affected by the ways in which statements and 
opinions are received in the boardroom, and will therefore be dependent on the women’s experiences of justice and 
cohesion. When female directors perceive to be treated in a just way, they may feel less interpersonal tension and need for 
fighting to be heard and in this way perceive lower levels of conflict in the BoD than female directors who 
experience lower levels of justice. Similarly, when female directors experience high levels of cohesion within the BoD, 
they probably feel that there is room for voicing their view and a positive climate within the BoD so that levels of conflicts 
are reduced or handled on an early stage. 
 
Hypothesis 4a Female directors who experience low levels of justice perceive higher levels of conflict in the 
boardroom than female directors who experience high levels of justice. 
 
Hypothesis 4b Female directors who experience low levels of cohesion perceive higher levels of conflict in the 
boardroom than female directors who experience high levels of cohesion. 
 
Demographic Factors 
 
When female directors have additional roles or attributes that distinguish them from other female directors, we assume 
that the feeling of being an outsider will be further enhanced. In this study, we focus on a situation that we believe is 
particularly relevant, namely when female directors have educational backgrounds that are different from those 
traditionally seen in BoD members (law, economics, and engineering). Education serves to socialize individuals to 
adopt a common world view, believe in a common set of values and use a common language (Jehn et al. 1997). 
Members with different educational backgrounds are likely to prefer different approaches to solve work-related problems. 
Educational background is therefore likely to trigger perceptions of in-groups or out-groups and it may be particularly 
challenging for women directors who have atypical educational backgrounds. 
On the other hand, females who chair BoDs may be able to set the agenda in the BoD and have a stronger influence on 
boardroom dynamics. Thus, as the most influential individual on the BoD, a female BoD chairperson may be able to 
reduce possible prejudices, ignorance, or other negative behaviors toward her  and  therefore  perceive boardroom 
dynamics more positively than other female directors. Thus, seen from a social identity theoretic perspective, female 
chair of BoD may no longer be placed as the ‘‘out-group’’ of the BoD as they are the ones who set the agenda that all 
BoD needs to follow regardless of whether they belong to the ‘‘in-group’’ or ‘‘out-group’’ of the BoD. The possession of 
the leading role is likely to make female chairpersons less vulnerable to unfair treatment and thus perceive higher levels 
of justice. In addition, these women have more control on the processes leading to positive team spirit in the BoD and will 
thus have a greater chance of experiencing a high degree of cohesion and a greater possibility to handle conflicts on an 
early stage. 
 
Hypothesis 5a Female directors who have a nontraditional educational background perceive lower levels of justice and 
cohesion, and higher levels of conflict in the boardroom than female directors who have a conventional educational 
background. 
 
Hypothesis 5b Female directors who are chairpersons of BoDs perceive higher levels of justice and cohesion, and 
lower levels of conflict in the boardroom than female directors who are not BoD leaders. 
 
 
Method 
 
Setting and Sample 
 
The study was conducted in Norway, a country that offers some benefits for the study of BoD processes. On the basis of a 
survey of Europe’s largest companies, the European Professional Women’s Network in 2007 nominated Norway as 
‘‘Europe’s Champion.’’ In 2007, shortly after the data were collected for the present study, the percentage of women on 
BoDs in Norwegian limited companies was 17 % (SSB 2008), which is about twice the European average. These 
numbers have possibly increased substantially following the introduction of legislation in 2008 mandating 40 % repre- 
 
sentation of both men and women on the BoDs of limited public companies (Masters 2008). Norwegian boardrooms are 
therefore an interesting field of research, because female participation is common, but, on the other hand, women are still in 
a marked minority among their fellow directors. The study was registered in the Norwegian social science data service. 
Data were collected by a written questionnaire. Respondents were targeted by approaching directors and CEOs 
attending courses on BoD management in Norway in the period from 2002 to 2005. Those attending these courses were 
encouraged to distribute questionnaires to their fellow directors and the CEO of their companies, and to return them upon 
completion. All persons gave their informed consent prior to their inclusion in the study. 
 
Measurements 
 
Measures of justice were taken from Colquitt (2001). The items were translated and adapted to reflect commitment to the 
BoD and the company. 
Distributive justice was measured with four items measuring the directors’ perceptions with reference to the BoD 
(three items) and the company (one item). Sample items were: ‘‘All things considered, what I get from being a director on  
this board  is equivalent  to  my effort,’’ and ‘‘Given what I accomplish for this company, I find my compensation 
adequate.’’ 
Procedural justice was measured with seven items. Two examples were: ‘‘I can influence decisions made by the 
BoD,’’ and ‘‘I believe that we (on this BoD) take care to follow good procedures.’’ 
Interpersonal justice was based on four items that measured the directors’ interpersonal justice perceptions with 
reference to the other directors collectively. Two items were: ‘‘I am always treated with respect (on this BoD),’’ and ‘‘I 
am always treated with politeness (on this BoD).’’ 
Informational justice was assessed with five items. Typical items were: ‘‘We are always informed in good time,’’ 
and ‘‘On this BoD, we take care to communicate clearly and in sufficient detail for everybody to understand what the 
issues are.’’ 
Task conflicts weres assessed with three items adapted from Jehn (1995). The items were: ‘‘We have conflicting 
ideas,’’ ‘‘there is disagreement over BoD work,’’ and ‘‘we have different opinions.’’ 
Interpersonal conflicts were assessed with four items from Jehn (1995). Two typical items were: ‘‘There are 
emotional conflicts between directors of this BoD,’’ and ‘‘Sometimes there may be conflicts between persons on this 
BoD.’’ 
Cohesion was measured with an adapted version of the scale developed by O’Reilly et al. (1989). The items were: ‘‘We 
are ready to defend each other from criticism by outsiders,’’ ‘‘On this BoD, the directors support and help each other to 
do the job,’’ and ‘‘On this BoD, the directors get along well with each other.’’ 
All items had a 7-point Likert-type response format ranging from completely disagree to completely agree. In order to 
control for common method bias, we first emphasized to respondents that answers would be treated strictly confidentially, 
and then we made clear that we were only interested in the respondents own attitudes and evaluations (Podsakoff et al. 
2003). Third, we followed the advice of Turangeau et al. (2000) an avoided the use of bipolar numerical scales.  
 
Results 
 
Description of the Sample 
 
The response rate was 37 %, amounting to 491 individual directors from BoDs of 149 companies. The median turn- 
over per company was 8.8 million NOK, and the modal turnover was 2.2 million NOK implying that the majority of 
companies were rather small. The Norwegian average for the same year was 2.700 NOK implying that the sample has 
companies of similar size to the Norwegian average. A total of 32 % of the directors in the sample were female, average 
age was 47 years for females and 50 years for males, and the average length of BoD membership was 11 years for 
females and 15 years for males. The number of directors per BoD ranged from one to nine. 
 
Scale Validation 
 
The quality of the measures was assessed with Cronbach’s alpha and principal component factor analysis. Table 1 reports 
the scale properties. All scales had adequate properties. Cronbach’s alpha ranged from .70 to .96, and the first factor 
in factor analyses of the items in each scale separately accounted for between 62 and 88 % of the variance of the 
items. The items for each scale were averaged for the further analyses. 
Gender differences suggested in Hypotheses 1–3b were evaluated with ANOVA. The results are shown in Table 2, and 
 
suggest that there were small mean differences between the genders. With a standard .05 level of significance, none 
of the differences were significant. The differences for Procedural justice (F = 3.78, p = .053) approached statistical 
significance, but the direction of scores was opposite to that predicted, meaning that female directors perceived higher 
levels of procedural justice than their male counterparts. The differences between the standard deviations for males and 
females were also small and did not reach statistical significance. Thus, female directors did not perceive lower levels of 
justice and cohesion, or higher levels of task or interpersonal conflict than their male fellows did. Hypotheses 1–3b are 
not supported. 
The proposed effects of justice and cohesion on perceived conflicts (Hypotheses 4a–b) were evaluated using a 
regression analysis. The results are displayed in Table 3. Regarding justice, all significant regression coefficients were in 
the hypothesized direction. Hypothesis 4a is supported. The regression coefficient of cohesion and task conflicts and 
Interpersonal conflicts were not significant meaning that Hypothesis 4b was not supported. Thus, when female directors 
perceive higher levels of justice, they also tend to perceive lower levels of conflict in their BoD. 
Table 1  Measurement properties of the variables 
N of 
items 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
% of variance 
accounted for by 
first factor 
Factor loadings first 
factor (smallest 
and largest) 
Communalities 
(smallest and largest) 
Distributive justice 4 .96 88 .92–.96 .85–.92 
Procedural justice 7 .89 62 .70–.88 .49–.78 
Interpersonal justice 4 .93 83 .86–.94 .73–.89 
Informational justice 5 .87 67 .73–.88 .53–.77 
Task conflicts 3 .70 62 .74–.84 .55–.70 
Interpersonal conflicts 4 .92 80 .88–.92 .77–.84 
Cohesion 3 .76 67 .77–.87 .59–.76 
Table 2  Differences between genders 
N = 413 Female mean Male mean Difference Significance 
anova 
Distributive justice 5.02 5.06 -.04 .83 
Procedural justice 5.84 5.67 .17 .05 
Interpersonal justice 6.47 6.32 .15 .09 
Informational justice 5.42 5.36 .06 .59 
Cohesion 5.55 5.46 .09 .36 
Task conflicts 3.43 3.64 .21 .11 
Interpersonal conflict 2.40 2.60 -.20 .20 
The positive or negative effects of additional demographic characteristics that made female directors even more diverse 
(Hypotheses 5a and 5b) were evaluated with ANOVA. The results of comparing female directors with traditional educational 
backgrounds with those who had nontraditional backgrounds (Hypothesis 5a) are presented in Table 4. All differences were 
in the hypothesized direction, but failed to meet significance criteria. Thus, female directors with nontraditional 
educational back-grounds perceived, to some extent, lower levels of justice and cohesion, and higher levels of task and 
interpersonal conflict and Hypothesis 5a receives some support. 
The results of comparing female directors who are chairpersons of BoDs with those who are not (Hypothesis 5b) are 
presented in Table 5.  The differences were generally not significant and not consistent. Hypothesis 5b is therefore not 
supported. 
Discussion 
Most previous studies of female boardroom representation have investigated whether the inclusion of female directors’ 
influence organizational outcomes positively or negatively. This study fills an important gap by investigating central 
aspects of the boardroom dynamics that may influence female directors’ possibility to contribute positively to 
organizational performance. Thus, the study reported here contributes to opening the ‘‘black box’’ that includes all the 
factors that may explain relationships between female BoD representation and organizational performance.  We   
Table 3  Regression of justice on conflict for female BoD members 
Dependent variable R2 (%) Regression coefficients  
Distributive justice Procedural justice Interpersonal justice Informational justice Cohesion 
Task conflicts 15 -.01 -.26 -.16 -.42* .00 
Interpersonal conflicts 27 .03 -.47* -.45* -.15 -.07 
N = 130; ** p B .01; * p B .05 
Table 4  Differences in mean perceptions between educational groups of female BoD members 
N = 136 Untraditional BoD member 
education 
Mean (N = 59) 
Traditional (legal, business and engineering 
education) 
Mean (N = 77) 
Difference Significance 
Distributive justice 4.82 5.19 -.37 .17 
Procedural justice 5.70 5.96 -.26 .06 
Interpersonal justice 6.37 6.54 -.18 .23 
Informational justice 5.25 5.55 -.30 .08 
Task conflicts 3.69 3.22 .47 .04 
Interpersonal 
conflicts 
2.67 2.20 .47 .08 
Cohesion 5.41 5.67 -.26 .15 
Table 5  Differences in mean perceptions between female leaders and non-leaders 
N = 136 Leaders (N = 22) Non-leaders Difference Significance 
Mean (N = 114) 
Distributive justice 5.14 4.44 .70 .05 
Procedural justice 5.81 6.04 -.23 .22 
Interpersonal justice 6.46 6.51 -.05 .77 
Informational justice 5.42 5.44 -.02 .94 
Conflict 3.60 3.40 .20 .54 
Emotional conflict 2.42 2.30 .12 .73 
Cohesion 5.53 5.67 -.14 .58 
proposed  hypotheses  based  on  social identity theory suggesting that female directors, who often constitute a minority 
within a BoD, frequently will be treated as an out-group within a BoD. The study examined the following main research 
hypotheses: (1) Female directors experience lower levels of justice and cohesion, and higher levels of conflict than 
male directors do. (2) Female directors who have nontraditional educational backgrounds are particularly likely to 
experience negative boardroom dynamics (3) Female chairpersons of BoDs perceive boardroom dynamics more 
positively than other female directors. (4) Female directors who experience low levels of justice and cohesion will also 
perceive high levels of conflict in the boardroom. 
Our findings suggest that there are generally few differences in the way female and male directors experience 
boardroom dynamics. Thus, opposed to our hypotheses, females did not perceive boardroom dynamics more 
negatively than male directors did. Our findings suggest that the gender composition of BoDs may be less important 
than proposed by researchers and practitioners, and female directors are welcomed as equal BoD members. Social identity 
theory suggests that group members compare themselves with others along demographic lines and that the extent to 
which they identify with the group depends on how much they have in common with other group members (Tajfel and 
Turner 1986).  A person’s social identity depends on what characteristics he or she feels most strongly about. A female 
director may feel more strongly about her educational background, professional experience, or industry association than 
she feels about her gender. If she identifies more strongly with other characteristics that she shares with the other 
directors, she may not perceive to be an out-group or token within the BoD. Furthermore, if a female director has several 
characteristic in common with the other directors than non-common characteristics, the other directors may treat her as 
an in-group member. Many women directors seem to have the same educational backgrounds and professional training 
as their male colleagues, and hence they may be perceived as professionals in their careers, and not primarily as women. 
Another explanation of the absence of any out-group effect could be attributed more directly to female directors’ 
characteristics. We may assume that female directors have attributes and show behaviors that make them less vulnerable to 
rejection and other negative group dynamics. Possibly, those women who have become board directors are often very 
experienced in their careers and have strong social skills, and hence they are highly respected. If this is the case, it is their 
performance in the past and their present behavior that explains why they feel well accepted in the boardroom. Although not 
statistically significant, we found that   female   directors   with   nontraditional   educational backgrounds perceived lower 
levels of justice and cohesion, and higher levels of conflict. A possible explanation of this finding is that these females are 
perceived as less competent, or with less relevant competence than female directors with the more traditional educational 
back-grounds. Linked to the assumption that the most respected female directors would have the most positive perceptions 
of the boardroom dynamics, we hypothesized that the female chairpersons of BoDs would have particularly positive 
perceptions. This hypothesis was not supported. A possible explanation for this is that because both female and male 
directors generally perceived boardroom processes positively and there was little difference between the genders, we have 
reached a ceiling effect that rules out differences between female directors and female chair- persons of BoDs. 
Overall, our findings indicate that there is no reason to believe that boardroom dynamics will be constrained by the 
mixture of female and male directors. 
Another finding from our study is that boardroom dynamics were related to the perceived level of conflict in BoDs, so 
that female directors who experienced low levels of justice and cohesion perceived higher levels of conflict in the 
boardroom. This finding probably reflects a situation where generally negative climates are more vulnerable to the 
development of conflict and this may be particularly apparent among minority groups. It should also be noted that these 
variables may partly overlap; there is thus a risk that the different variables are measuring very similar issues and therefore 
correlate strongly. 
Theoretical Implications and Future Research 
We based our research questions on social identity theory about in-groups and out-groups that has strong empirical 
support (Turner and Haslam 2001). In spite of this, the findings indicate that women directors do not constitute out-
groups and do not perceive boardroom dynamics differently from male directors. An implication of this finding is that 
there may not be gender minority issues on BoDs, or alternatively, that the gender minority issues are more complex than 
we have managed to grasp with the variables included in this study. An avenue for future studies, therefore, may be to 
investigate different subgroups of female directors to explore whether some are more vulnerable to becoming outsiders 
than others. For instance, personality differences and different levels of social competence between female directors 
could possibly reveal divergent perceptions about boardroom processes. Another interesting development of this research 
area could be to investigate what types of characteristics female directors identify most strongly with (e.g., educational or 
professional background, relevant experience, or gender), and whether different types of social identification influences their 
perception of the boardroom dynamics. 
Furthermore, the minority–majority proportion may influence perceptions of boardroom dynamics. When there is only 
one female director on a BoD, she may be more vulnerable to negative boardroom dynamics than if there are two or three 
female directors (see Torchia et al. 2011). This issue is particularly relevant because several countries have mandatory 
female representation on BoDs, and to comply with the legislation, many BoDs will possibly include only one woman. Will 
these lone female directors perceive boardroom dynamics differently than females who are on BoDs with other females? 
Practical Implications 
We have found that (our specific Norwegian) women directors do not perceive boardroom dynamics very different 
from men. Given the political controversies about actions to enforce increased female representation in BoDs, our 
negative findings probably are much more interesting than positive findings would have been. Our findings challenge 
the common assumption that female directors are different. The study thus indicates that there are few reasons to believe 
that the presence of women directors affects boardroom dynamics. Likewise, we do not show that women bring any 
improvements in or changes to boardroom dynamics. However, recruiting more women as directors has other 
implications. On an ideal and moral basis, having more women on BoDs will promote equality between genders (see 
Bilimoria 2000; Daily and Dalton 2003b). A more pragmatic argument for having more women on BoDs is the 
simple fact that the number of potential recruits will increase when both women and men are considered (as pointed 
out in Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Furthermore, as Fonda and Sassalos (2000) argue, when the pool of recruits is 
expanded, there is the potential for greater diversity that often brings new ideas, different voices, and alternative 
perspectives. For many companies, stimuli like these are exactly what are needed to assess and develop strategic 
positions. 
Methodological Limitations 
The study involved only Norwegian BoDs. As pointed out in the introduction, there has been a strong focus on female 
directors in Norway where 40 % female representation is mandatory for public companies. Furthermore, Norway is a 
country with generally high gender equality. These contextual factors could have influenced the results of this 
study and our results may limit generalizability to many other countries or cultures. 
Unfortunately, we did not include variables such as firm performance or firm innovation that would have enabled us to 
study the effects of female directors’ perceptions of BoD dynamics on BoD performance. This should be addressed in future 
studies. 
Conclusions 
The results indicate that female directors do not experience boardroom dynamics more negatively than male directors; 
rather, a tendency is seen in the opposite direction. Thus, females seem to be welcomed into boardrooms and do not 
perceive that they are treated like outsiders. An implication of this finding is that female directors are probably able to 
present their possibly different views and competencies to the BoD and in this way enhance boardroom capabilities. 
Appendix: Questionnaire 
Distributive justice (Colquitt 2001) 
Overall, my outcome (pay, fringe benefits, academically, socially and network etc.) from my work on this BoD reflects my efforts 
My outcome is appropriate comparing to the work I have completed 
My outcome reflects what I contribute to this company  
My outcome is justified, given my performance 
Procedural justice (Colquitt 2001) 
On this BoD, I feel that I have the opportunity to express my views and feelings when things are being decided 
I have a high influence over decisions that are being made 
On this BoD, we emphasize the use of good procedures 
Our decisions are well weighed out, and all interests are taken into consideration 
In my opinion, the decisions are based on accurate information  
In my experience, I have ample opportunity to appeal decisions I did not agree to 
I think that the work on this BoD is executed after the highest ethical standards 
Interpersonal justice (Colquitt 2001) 
On this BoD, I am always treated with politeness 
On this BoD, I am always treated with dignity  
On this BoD, I am always treated with respect 
I never receive improper remarks or comments 
Informational justice (Colquitt 2001) 
The other BoD members are always candid toward me 
The entire BoD always understands the complete background for issues that are decided and implemented 
Explanations and reasons for decisions are always reasonable 
We are always informed in a timely manner 
On this BoD, we are good at tailoring the level of communication to each BoD member’s needs, so that everybody understands what the 
cases are about 
Task conflicts (Jehn 1995) 
We have conflicting ideas 
There is disagreement over BoD work  
We have different opinions 
Interpersonal conflicts (Jehn 1995)  
There is friction between BoD members 
There are emotional conflicts between directors of this BoD  
There is tension between BoD members 
Sometimes there may be emotional conflicts between persons on this BoD 
Cohesion (O’Reilly et al. 1989) 
We are ready to defend each other from criticism by outsiders  
On this BoD, the directors support and help each other to do the job 
On this BoD, the directors get along well with each other 
All items had a 7-point Likert-type response format ranging from completely disagree to completely agree 
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